Zachary Hadley, PhD Candidate
AGS Paris
In February 2014, the Chairperson of the African Union stated that the primary purpose behind the AU-MISCA mission was to set the conditions for the deployment of an UN-led peacekeeping mission within six to nine months. A report by the UN Secretary-General cited political progress despite deteriorating security as the key factor in his support for the rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers. Despite the progress made by AU-MISCA and Operation Sangaris, a military intervention could not fully address the socio-economic roots of CAR’s instability. It was argued that an UN-led mission was “uniquely positioned to deploy and sustain a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with the full range of capacities”[^1].
In a renewed diplomatic push, the Transitional Authority supported a regional initiative to reopen an inclusive dialogue with ex-Séléka, anti-Balaka, and other armed militias. On July 23, 2014 parties signed an agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities and Violence at Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo. The settlement agreed to inclusive political institutions, the reintegration of former rebels into the national army and the implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program.
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was authorized in April 2014 with an initial one year mandate[^2]. After a transitional period, MINUSCA superseded AU-MISCA on September 15, 2014. The appointment of the current AU-MISCA commander, Major General Martin Tumenta Chomusa ensured continuity across the chain of command during the transition. The MINUSCA mandate provided broad power for the mission to assist the Transitional Government with preparations for elections no later than February 2015. UN peacekeepers would work with EUFOR-RCA, ECCAS, AU-RTF, and the French military to restore peace and stability to the region. The deployment of MINUSCA troop and police unit was relatively rapid in comparison to previous efforts.
Despite the Brazzaville agreement, armed groups still exerted significant influence across CAR. An estimated 2,000 ex-Séléka fighters and approximately 1,500 anti-Balaka militiamen posed a direct threat and aggravated lingering political tensions[^3]. Violence flared again in early October 2014 as anti-Balaka elements attempted wrestle control of the KM-5 quarter of Bangui from ex-Séléka fighters. French and MINUSCA forces were called in to restore order after a Muslim taxi-driver was murdered by a mob accused of throwing a grenade into a crowd. The murder triggered sectarian clashes in both Bambari and Bangui. On October 9, 2014, MINUSCA experienced its first casualty when a Pakistani peacekeeper was killed and several injured during an ambush on a UN convoy[^4]. In the eastern regions, the African Union Regional Joint Taskforce (AU-JTF) led by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) and U.S. Special Operations continued the hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army with mixed success.
Despite tense security, the Transitional Authority made progress towards holding democratic elections with support by ECCAS representatives including the Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso and President Ali Bongo Ondimbda of Gabon. In March 2015, the UN authorized an additional 750 military personnel, 280 police personnel and 20 correction officers while extending the MINUSCA mandate through April 30, 2016. In addition to continued protection of civilian, the mandate included tasks to assist with national and international judicial proceedings, implement DDR programs and security sector reforms, and counter-illicit trafficking and exploitation of natural resources. Despite the authorization and growing mandate, many African peacekeeping contributors faced significant logistical and deployment-related challenges. Closing the capability gap requires substantial funding and resources from the “Group of Five” (G5) including the AU, UN, EU, United States, and France.
In December 2015, a constitutional referendum passed with significant public support – paving the way for general elections on December 30. The lack of a clear presidential winner resulted in run-off elections in February and March 2016. On March 30, 2016, Faustin-Archange Touadéra was sworn into office with a promise to enact reforms and build on the peace efforts undertaken by the Transitional Authority. In his inauguration speech, Touadéra expressed a desire to “quickly approve the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration program”[^5].
In July 2016, the UN reauthorized the MINUSCA mandate through November 2017. This was followed by resolution 2387 (2017), which renewed MINUSCA through November 15, 2018. A recent UN report cited signs of political progress towards the end of 2017[^6]. Country-wide outreach programs have continued working towards reducing violence through community-level transitional justice initiatives. Increasingly, CAR military and police are working to reassert its authority and rule of law over its border region while limiting the free flow of illicit weapons and natural resource trafficking.
Despite progress, national reconciliation remains uncertain as the cycle of low-intensity sectarian violence plagues communities.
Periodic armed clashes between anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka armed groups continue – predominantly over the control of land and resources. The humanitarian situation remains critical with repatriation efforts unable to cope with the large number of refugees and IDPs. The fragile gains achieved are thus reversible without continued commitment of significant UN resources and peacekeepers.
UN-MINUSCA Model Assessment
The results demonstrate partial support for the model across the top African contributors. Only Rwanda meets the defined threshold for full model support. Low scores on political accountability impact many contributors full ascension. However, the majority of states achieve upper quantile scores in at least two explanatory variables including good governance and regional leadership with strong participation in UN and AU decision-making organs.
There is a significant regional dynamic within MINUSCA due to the direct involvement of ECCAS and its member states though MICOPAX and later, AU-MISCA.
This provides a marked difference from MONUSCO, which largely relies on outside support for contributions. As a result, the MINUSCA case provides robust support for the institutional rationale. The political and trade rationales are mixed due to the wide variance in contributor profiles from Zambia to the Republic of Congo.
| Rank |
TCC/PCC |
REC - ECCAS |
Governance |
Political Accountability |
Regional Leadership |
Trade Across Borders |
Model Support? |
| 1 |
Cameroon |
Yes |
46.80 |
0.29 |
1.00 |
47.74 |
Partial |
| 2 |
Rwanda |
Yes |
63.07 |
0.37 |
1.00 |
48.26 |
Partial |
| 3 |
Burundi |
Yes |
42.10 |
-0.21 |
3.00 |
39.35 |
Partial |
| 4 |
Congo |
Yes |
43.30 |
0.18 |
1.00 |
15.56 |
Minimal |
| 5 |
Morocco |
No |
58.40 |
0.75 |
0.00 |
83.83 |
Full |
| 6 |
Egypt |
No |
48.06 |
0.18 |
2.00 |
71.42 |
Partial |
| 7 |
DR Congo |
Yes |
35.47 |
0.20 |
0.00 |
29.52 |
Minimal |
| 8 |
Zambia |
No |
58.57 |
0.64 |
0.00 |
40.80 |
Partial |
| 9 |
Gabon |
Yes |
51.33 |
0.30 |
0.00 |
63.65 |
Partial |
| 10 |
Mauritania |
No |
44.20 |
0.58 |
2.00 |
56.43 |
Partial |
| |
Pop. Mean |
|
50.82 |
0.52 |
0.44 |
52.87 |
|
| |
Pop. Median |
|
50.35 |
0.58 |
0.00 |
57.10 |
|
| Note: Individual state scores are averaged across the time period from 2014-2016. |
</table>
Cameroon as the top contributor to MINUSCA is a reliable partner for regional security cooperation, working with neighboring states to contain instability in CAR, counter Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and coordinating counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition to MINUSCA, Cameroon also provides modest police contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Mali (MINUSMA), DRC (MONUSCO), and Darfur (UNAMID). The foreign policy apparatus is highly centralized within the Biya regime, which has dominated Cameroonian politics since 1982. As a result, Cameroon ranks in the middle quartile on the polity measure as a hybrid regime. In recent years, the Cameroonian Armed Forces have benefitted from significant levels of military aid from western partners including the U.S. and France. Yet, its overall level of militarization is low relative to civil society – providing support for the model. Cameroon actively supports AU peace and security efforts by providing a regional training institution for police units and hosts an AU continental logistics hub. Centrally located at the crossroads of the Great Lakes region, Lake Chad Basin, and the Gulf of Guinea, Cameroon’s ability to contain instability while improving its trade infrastructure is key to sustainable economic development.
The transnational roots of instability within CAR partly compelled its regional neighbors, Burundi and Rwanda, to support the military intervention under AU-MISCA in 2013. Evidence of growing sectarian violence provided a combustible mixture of religious and tribal tensions that threatened to inflame the region. Although both states provided contingents, their divergent outcomes suggests support for the hypothesis that credible domestic institutions increase the likelihood for peacekeeping support. Rwanda, which achieves high scores on political, economic, and institutional rationales is considered an important UN contributor. Leveraging its comparative advantages, Rwanda has deployed police units, infantry battalions, and a medical field hospital to CAR. Despite its military capacity, Rwanda’s overall militarization score is within the middle quartile across African states. In terms of polity, Rwanda has improved its political institutions post-genocide under the ruling Kagame regime. However, criticisms of its increasingly authoritarian hold on civil society detracts from its preferred pro-reform narrative[^7]. As a result, its overall polity score remains sequestered to the middle quartile and is assessed as a hybrid regime. Despite these domestic challenges, the results provide support for the model.
In comparison, allegations of corruption and scandal have plagued the Burundian contingent[^8]. Low scores on both governance and political accountability reflect its domestic challenges as the ruling regime under current President Pierre Nkurunziza has suppressed potential rivals with allegations of politically motivated killings. Despite his strong-arm tactics, Nkurunziza won reelection for a contentious third term in 2015. In 2017, the UN chose not replace several Burundian police units after reports of serious human rights violations. Efforts to shift focus its domestic challenges while improving Burundi’s international image provides support to the institutional rationale for its contributions. Despite unit readiness issues, Burundi’s overall level of militarization is high with a score in the upper quartile across African states. In terms of the normative rationale, Burundi’s drift towards autocracy challenges the norms based argument for contributions. Efforts to improve Burundi’s political institutions and encourage the peaceful transition of power in the upcoming 2020 Burundian presidential elections may lead to a more reliable and effective peacekeeping partner. Recent allegations of purges of Tutsi officers from the reintegrated Burundian military risks exacerbating latent ethnic tensions[^9]. Without continued regional pressure on the regime to abide by the 2000 Arusha Accords, Burundi risks a return to former instability.
North African states including Mauritania, Egypt, and Morocco are top contributors to MINUSCA. Despite the lack of regional trade linkages to CAR and having suffered peacekeeper casualties, each state provides robust support to the mission. Each state is well-represented within UN and AU decision-making organs, lending support for the institutional rationale. Morocco has become a vocal supporter for MINUSCA, arguing that greater commitments are required by the international community to limit sectarian violence.
>The perception that CAR is a “quagmire’’ with an intractable set of socio-economic problems has curtailed support for African contributions.
Mauritania is notable for its first significant UN contribution with the deployment of its Formed Police Unit (FPU) in December 2015. Each of the North African states achieve upper quartile scores on militarization and national capability. However, it is not clear that the presence of high levels of militarization in Morocco and Mauritania are indicative of their military institutions having significant influence over foreign policy decisions due to the consolidation of political power within the executive branches. As a potential outlier, Egypt under President al-Sisi continues to trend towards autocracy with the military wielding considerable political clout due to its durable support to the ruling regimes for almost six decades[^10].
MINUSCA is unique for contributions from the DRC and Republic of Congo despite low scores across governance, political accountability, regional leadership, and trade. Both states contributed peacekeepers largely to contain spillover due to their shared borders with CAR. However, the effort to address the growing refugee crisis and improve DRC’s international image was soon undermined by UN reports of poor performance and allegations of abuse by western-trained FARDC units. The DRC withdrew its contingents from MINUSCA in 2016. Low scores on political accountability and trade limit support for political and economic rationales. The decision-making apparatus within the Kabila regime is highly centralized and limited trade with CAR provides few economic incentives beyond natural resource extraction. Security rationales may explicate DRC and the Republic of Congo’s interests in CAR due to concerns of potential spillover and the desire to improve the credibility of their security forces. However, their divergence on militarization makes a cursory assessment problematic as the DRC achieves a lower quartile score while the Republic of Congo is firmly in the upper quartile across African states. Recent efforts to increase its trade integration within the Great Lakes region will require DRC to implement needed security sector reforms to secure its borders and provide for its internal security. Ultimately, DRC appears an outlier as no rationale provides a clear fit for its participation in MINUSCA.
The Republic of Congo under President Sassou-Nguesso led mediation efforts during the political transition from the Bozizé administration to the Touadéra administration in 2016. A 2017 UN review of the Congo contingent found “systemic problems in command and control’’ that contributed to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse[^11]. These findings were compounded by substandard readiness levels, overall discipline problems, and a lack of logistical capabilities required to sustain Congolese troops in the field. As a result, Republic of Congo chose to withdrawal its units in late 2017. Like DRC, the Congo has low scores on governance, political accountability, and trade. However in his role as the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) Chairperson, President Sassou-Nguesso stated that regional peace was a primary motivation for his state’s continued support to MINUSCA[^12]. The state ranks in the bottom quartile on the polity measure indicating an authoritarian regime. The military lacks modern equipment and has limited resources to conduct sustained operations with most capabilities focused on domestic security. As a result, neither score provides clear support for normative or security rationales.
In 2018, Gabon announced its intention to withdrawal from MINUSCA citing “the progressive return to peace and stability.” The Gabonese contingent was implicated in the sexual abuse allegations and was challenged by poor discipline, low readiness levels, and lack of necessary equipment. The withdrawal of Guinea was a setback for MINUSCA and has increased pressure on the mission to identify new contributors to sustain the mission. As a founding member of ECCAS, Gabon is well-integrated into the regional economy. It has pushed for greater policy harmonization efforts but the free movement of people remains a stumbling block for many of the richer states including Cameroon, due to migration concerns. Significant wealth inequality and the consolidation of political power within Gabon contributes to low scores on political measures. Regardless, Gabon’s trade linkages and membership in ECCAS provides partial model support. On militarization, national capability Gabon achieves middle quartile scores compared to other African states. Since 2006, Gabon has shown mixed improvement on democratic measures despite a low score on the polity measure. Security and normative rationales as inconclusive.
[^1]: United Nations Security Council S/2014/142. (2014). Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013). Retrieved from <https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/247/62.pdf>
[^2]: United Nations Security Council S/RES/2149. (2014). Resolution 2149 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7153rd meeting, on 10 April 2014. Retrieved from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/295/81/pdf/N1429581.pdf>
[^3]: United Nations Security Council S/2014/762. (2014). Letter dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) addressed to the President of the Security Council. Retrieved from <https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/538/97/pdf/N1453897.pdf>
[^4]: Dembassa-Kette, A. (2014). At least 31 people killed in Central African Republic fighting. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.businessinsider.com/r-at-least31-people-killed-in-central-african-republic-fighting-2014-15>
[^5]: Dembassa-Kette, A. (2016). Central African Republic's president vows peace. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-president/central-african-republics-president-vows-peace-reforms-at-inauguration-idUSKCN0WW1ZG>
[^6]: United Nations Security Council S/2018/125. (2018). Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General (MINUSCA). Retrieved from <https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/028/58/pdf/N1802858.pdf>
[^7]: Seay, L. (2016, June 3). Is Rwanda’s authoritarian state sustainable. Retrieved from <https://www.realclearworld.com/2016/06/05/is_rwandas_authoritarian_state_sustainable_176080.html>
[^8]: Moncrieff, R., & Vircoulon, T. (2017, September 1). The Burundian army’s dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping. African Arguments.
[^9]: Ross, A. (2017, July 4). Burundi authorities purging army on ethnic lines: rights group. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/usburundi-politics/burundi-authorities-purging-army-on-ethnic-lines-rightsgroup-idUSKBN19P1MA>
[^10]: Barany, Z. (2017). The Influence of North African Militaries in Foreign Policy-Making. Middle East Institute.
[^11]: United Nations Secretary General (2017). A Note to Correspondents on MINUSCA. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2017-06-21/note-correspondents-minusca>
[^12]: Lang, D. (2017). Addis Ababa January 2017. Panapress. Retrieved from <https://www.panapress.com/Addis-Ababa-Jan-2017-sd_addis2017-d1-lang1-p11.html>