UN MINUSMA

Zachary Hadley, PhD Candidate

AGS Paris

In March 2013, representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations met with members from the AU-PSC, AU-AFISMA, ECOWAS, and the Malian government to discuss options for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The parties agreed that a multidimensional stabilization mission was best suited to address underlying political, socio-economic, and security factors that contributed to Malian instability. Although Operation Serval had made significant progress, the continued presence of armed groups in northern Mali represented a transnational threat due to porous borders between Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Niger. Moreover, the cross-border flow of human trafficking, narcotics, small arms, and smuggling threatened to destabilize the entire Sahel region¹.

An UN assessment team developed options for a phased approach that allowed for the initial mission to focus on stabilization efforts while a parallel force conducted peace enforcement and counter-terrorism activities². UNSCR 2100 (2013) authorized the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, 2013 for an initial period of 12 months. With an authorized troop strength of 11,200 military and 1,440 police personnel, the broad mandate required the stabilization of key population centers, the reestablishment of state authority over its territories, the implementation of a transitional roadmap, protection of civilians and UN personnel, promotion of human rights and support to humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation, national and international justice³. The mandate was complex – thrusting UN peacekeepers into an active theater of conflict. Tasked with the responsibility to protect population centers without a peace enforcement mandate – the MINUSMA mission was reliant on the Operation Serval parallel force to combat armed groups operating in the north⁴.

The stand-up of the MINUSMA headquarters in June 2013 set the conditions for receipt of follow-on forces. However, due to challenges with training, equipping, and deployment most incoming units would not arrive in theater until the end of the calendar year⁵. AU-AFISMA forces continued to play a significant role during and after the transition. AU-AFISMA officially “re-hatted’’ to blue helmets during a ceremony in Bamako during which the AU committed its support towards the political process “in a bid to efficiently respond to the multifaceted threat facing this region and the Sahel’’⁶. Approximately 6,000 military personnel of the total authorized strength of 12,600 were on-hand as MINUSMA assumed the peacekeeping mission on July 1, 2013. Citing domestic security concerns, Nigeria withdrew its contingent of 850 troops from the mission. Reports suggest that the government was not satisfied by the command structure and leadership of MINUSMA. Nigerian Major General Shehu Adbulkadir, who previously commanded the ECOWAS and AU-AFISMA force, was replaced by Rwandan Major General Jean Bosco Kazura. The withdrawal of the Nigerian contingent was seen as “a blow for the new UN force’’⁷.

On June 18, 2013, the Mali transitional government and armed groups including the Mouvement national our la liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) and Haut conseil pour l’unite de l’Azawad (HCUA) signed a preliminary agreement to hold the presidential election and inclusive peace talks⁸. A spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the truce stipulated an immediate ceasefire and provided an opportunity for “sustainable peace in Mali through an inclusive dialogue that will take place after the election.” Despite the ceasefire, tensions persisted with reports of periodic violations. In the remote north, French-led operations against AQIM and its affiliates continued. The European Union Training Mission in Mali continued to focus on security sector reform and capacity building.

Presidential elections in July and August 2013, reported high voter turnout under generally calm conditions. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta defeated Soumaïla Cissé in a run-off election to become the next president of Mali⁹. Post-election, the Malian government hosted a series of regional conferences with former rebel groups, community representatives, and experts to develop recommendations for political and economic reforms, social development programs, and national reconciliation efforts in northern Mali. In November 2013, parliamentary elections occurred with a higher voter turnout (39 percent) than in 2007 (33 percent). Elections were observed to be generally free and fair by independent election monitors¹⁰. Despite progress, the security situation had deteriorated since the deployment of MINUSMA forces. Terrorist groups had reconstituted to conduct complex attacks in major urban centers in Kidal, Gao, and Ménaka. The use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices, and rocket attacks provided a significant threat to MINUSMA peacekeepers. On at least four separate occasions, French forces under Operation Serval responded to “imminent and serious’’ threats to MINUSMA peacekeepers under attack by AQIM and MOJWA elements in northern Mali. With train and equip efforts still underway for many peacekeeping contributors – MINUSMA personnel strength had plateaued at 5,539 personnel by the end of 2013. However, more progress was made in the deployment of police personnel due to less complex equipping and deployment related challenges.

In June 2014, the UN reauthorized the MINUSMA mandate for an additional year. Periodic assessments cited continued political progress despite the fragile security environment. In August 2014, Operation Serval transitioned to Operation Barkhane after a reorganization of French forces across the Sahel region. Illicit trafficking, violent extremism, transnational crime, and human migration required a regional focus to coordinate French-led peace and security efforts. In February 2014, a summit of five Sahel countries including Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mali agreed to the formation of a new security alliance, the G5 Sahel to address regional security threats. With the support of France, the U.S., and the African Union, the G5 Sahel would establish initiatives to combat violent extremist groups and address the underlying socio-economic factors that give rise to such groups¹¹. The effort was nested to the AU-PSC’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The concept of employment, funding, and resources was part of a multi-year effort to stand-up a regional counter-terrorism task force. A UN Secretary-General report on the situation in Mali in June 2017 recommended that the UN approve the deployment of the joint force to assist in regional peace and security efforts. On June 21, 2017, the UN authorized the effort under UNSRC 2359 (2017).

Subsequent UN resolutions renewed the MINUSMA mandate with the current authorization set at 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel through June 30, 2018. Significant challenges remain as security conditions within northern Mali remains tenuous. Allegations of corruption within the Keita government, human rights violations by the Malian Defense Forces, and renewed fighting in northern Mali between armed groups threatens to erase the difficult gains achieved since 2013. As 90 percent of the Malian economy is derived from commerce, trade, and gold operations in the south, a socio-economic divide along geographical lines risks eroding its national reconciliation efforts. Stalled implementation of the 2015 Bamako Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali risks reigniting conflict between the Tuareg community and the central government. Moreover, the systemic poverty, human migration, and climate change may aggravate the socio-economic factors that give rise to insecurity.

At present, more than 118 UN peacekeepers have been killed in Mali leading some to call MINUSMA the “world’s deadliest UN peacekeeping mission”¹².

The G5 Sahel task force may complement the political process in Mali but cannot replace it. Ultimately, future success depends upon the ability of ECOWAS, the regional institutions, and international community to pressure all belligerents to abide by the agreement and achieve the MINUSMA mandate to end the “cycle of violence and chaos”¹³.

UN MINUSMA Model Assessment

Rank	TCC/PCC	ECOWAS	Governance	Political Accountability	Regional Leadership	Trade Across Borders	Model Support?
1	Burkina Faso	Yes	53.23	1.06	0.00	29.34	Partial
2	Chad	No	34.95	-0.02	6.00	11.46	Minimal
3	Togo	Yes	49.75	0.66	1.00	68.50	Full
4	Niger	Yes	50.02	0.81	3.00	21.05	Partial
5	Senegal	Yes	61.02	1.11	1.00	74.88	Full
6	Guinea	Yes	44.15	0.51	4.00	59.65	Full
7	Benin	Yes	58.73	0.96	1.00	62.50	Full
8	Nigeria	Yes	46.27	0.78	5.00	50.12	Full
9	Ghana	Yes	65.15	1.01	0.00	59.65	Full
10	Rwanda	No	62.73	0.37	2.00	48.64	Partial
	Pop. Mean		50.75	0.52	0.45	52.51
	Pop. Median		50.25	0.58	0.00	57.26
Note: Individual state scores are averaged across the time period from 2013-2016

Five of the top ten MINUSMA contributors fully support the model’s predictions with upper quantile scores on good governance, political accountability, regional leadership, and trade integration. Three states including Burkina Faso, Niger, and Rwanda are assessed as providing partial support. This is largely the result of low trade integration scores in comparison to the population average across all African states. However, a closer inspection reveals a gradual improvement on trade within those states over the past decade. Chad stands as an outlier from other top contributors due to its low scores on governance, political accountability, and trade.

Burkina Faso as a founding member of ECOWAS has shown steady improvement on good governance measures since the early aughts. However, its trade integration continues to lag behind other top contributors due to frequent state interventions in its export market and high import duties. The World Trade Organization and World Bank have supported initiatives to accelerate Burkina Faso’s regional integration, which has led to limited economic reforms and market diversification. However, a lack of competitive exports and its landlocked status present significant challenges to Burkina Faso’s economic development. Due to its shared border with Mali, Burkina Faso likely have significant national security interests for providing support to MINUSMA. Burkina Faso approved a contingent of troops to support the UN mission in July 2013. By 2018, total contributions had tripled in strength. Despite mounting casualties, Burkina Faso has remained a reliable UN partner for peacekeeping. However, the restrictive MINUSMA mandate led Burkina Faso to support the creation of the G5 Sahel to coordinate offensive actions against armed rebel groups operating across the region (Koeta, 2017). The Burkinabe military is principally focused on ensuring its territorial integrity and providing for its internal security. However, it remains dependent upon foreign assistance for training and equipment. The military lacks the ability to self-sustain for long periods abroad. Overall, Burkina Faso has experienced relatively low levels of militarization compared to other African states. After the failed 2015 coup led by members of the Regiment of Presidential Security, the military was influential in restoring the civilian-led transitional government. Since 2012, Burkina Faso has demonstrated progress towards democratic rule and pluralist institutions with upper quartile scores on polity. These results may indicate possible support for the normative rationale.

Chad was an early contributor to the Malian intervention despite not being an ECOWAS member. Under the ruling authoritarian Déby regime, Chad occupies low quartiles on good governance and political accountability. Political power is highly centralized within the executive branch and the decision to commit peacekeepers mostly resides with the president. Despite the opportunity for Chad to serve as a nexus for commerce and transportation in the Lake Chad Basin, poor infrastructure and mediocre regional integration contributes to its low trade score in comparison to other African states. Systemic corruption remain a significant impediment to sustainable economic growth (Chêne, 2014). Yet, Chad’s substantial presence within regional institutions during the Malian crisis suggests support for the institutional rationale. Desires to improve its international image while gaining access to needed resources provides significant benefits to the regime with few domestic political costs. Moreover, Chad provides an important regional hub for counter-terrorism efforts across the Sahel region and the capital of N’Djamena serves as the headquarters for the French-led Operation Barkhane. Despite having self-deployed to Mali in 2013, the Chadian military is minimally equipped to support deployments beyond its contiguous borders. The principle focus of the military is to ensure its territorial integrity and internal security. Chad has experienced high levels of militarization for the past few decades. The durability of Déby regime leads to high scores on the autocratic polity measure. As a result, the normative rationale for contributions does not hold.

Contributors which provide full model support include Togo, Senegal, Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana. Each state is a member of ECOWAS and supported the initial intervention under AU-AFISMA. Togo contributions to MINUSMA began in 2013. Despite its relatively small geographic size and population, Togo is an important partner for peace and security efforts on the continent with its first significant contribution to UN-MINURCA in 1998. Togo achieves middle quartile scores on governance and political accountability resulting from instability surrounding the Gnassingbé regime following a military coup and contested elections in 2005. Accusations of political repression against regime opponents and the violent crackdown against anti-regime protestors occurred as recently as 2017. Despite its domestic challenges, Togo is well-integrated into the West African economy with an upper quartile score on trade integration. Reforms to Togo’s economic and trade policies have led to steady improvement in the domestic economy since the early aughts. However, Togo remains heavily reliant on agricultural and food imports due to a lack of technological and infrastructure investments (AFDB, 2016). Efforts to improve Togo’s political stability may spur foreign investments to improve its trade deficits and promote sustainable economic growth. In terms of militarization, Togo scores in the second quartile across African states. Likewise, Togo exhibits approximately median scores across autocratic and democratic polity measures. As such, the results suggest minimal support for security and normative rationales as predicted by the model.

Benin has also proven a reliable support for AU and UN-led peacekeeping on the continent. Benin has deployed peacekeepers to Cote D’Ivoire, Mali, South Sudan, Liberia, Darfur, and the DRC. Despite its relatively small size, investment in the modernization of the Benin military has increased its capacity to reliably deploy and sustain its peacekeeping contingents abroad. However, the state achieves relatively low scores on militarization providing empirical support for the model predictions. Benin also displays strong scores on good governance, political accountability, and democracy measures. It achieves upper quartile scores on democratic polity, which may be indicative of support for the normative rationale. To reduce its reliance on mineral and agricultural exports, Benin has focused on increasing its economic competitiveness with investments in transportation infrastructure and economic reforms. Benin has supported efforts to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. However, lagging trade liberalization within ECOWAS – in part, due to Nigerian protectionism – has stalled deeper regional integration (Bensassi, Jarreau, \& Mitaritonna, 2017). Despite exogenous constraints on trade, Togo provides robust support for the model.

As a regional power and founding member of ECOWAS, Nigeria scores in the upper quartiles across governance, trade, and regional leadership measures. Nigeria led early coordination efforts to develop a regional response to the crisis in Mali. In December 2012, the UN approved an ECOWAS intervention plan to deploy 3,300 troops under Nigerian command and control. Fears that the fighting in Mali would threaten the entire Sahel region led former President Goodluck Jonathan to commit an initial 1,200 Nigerian troops in January 2013 (Murdock, 2013). However, it soon became clear that Nigeria’s overstretched military would be unable to fulfill its initial pledge due to mounting challenges against Boko Haram. As a result, other AU member states were required to increase their burden share to mitigate shortfalls in funding and contributions. Nigeria’s goal to demonstrate its regional power is constrained by public perceptions of systemic corruption, socio-economic challenges, and insecurity. Continued improvement on good governance, political accountability, and the promotion of democratic norms are required to improve its international image and credibility. On militarization, Nigeria scores in the bottom quartile across African states. In terms of polity, Nigeria achieves median scores on democratic measures, which again provides support for the conclusions that normative and security rationales are indeterminate in terms of predictive power.

Niger and Rwanda provide partial support for the model. Niger as an active contributor to MINUSMA shares a contiguous border with Mali and has taken a lead role in stability efforts across the trans-Sahel region. Recent efforts to increase its trade integration have led to the promotion of tourism, sustainable development, and economic reforms. However, its agricultural-based economy and landlocked nature constrains significant economic growth. Ranked as one of the poorest nations in the world, Niger must confront myriad challenges to develop its economy, contain instability at its borders, and mitigate the growing impacts of climate change. The increased focus on security partnerships to address regional instability led Niger to join the G5 Sahel in 2014. On militarization, Niger scores in the bottom quartile despite robust support to regional peace and security efforts. It also scores high on the autocratic polity measure due to limited progress on increasing its pluralist institutions. Taken together, the results reinforce earlier conclusion that security and normative rationales are inconclusive in terms of contributions. Because of its geographic location, Niger’s active participation in regional institutions will ensure its continued support for African-led peace and security efforts over the coming decade.

Rwanda displays strong scores on governance and regional leadership providing support for both political and institutional rationales. Rwanda has shown steady progress in trade integration within the Central African region since the end of the Congo wars. However, Rwanda must improve its infrastructure to reduce transportation costs associated with its landlocked status and distance to ports. Rwanda’s ability to leverage the East African Community (EAC) intra-regional trade agreements will support economic growth by increasing its export competitiveness. Rwanda stands out as a top contributor to MINUSMA despite its relatively small size and lack of affiliation with ECOWAS. During the past decade, Rwanda has been a reliable contributor citing the lessons-learned from the Rwandan genocide (“Service born of sacrifice,’’ 2018). In June 2013, the UN Secretary General appointed Rwandan Major General Jean Bosco Kazura as commander of the MINUSMA upon transition from AU-AFISMA. Rwandan-native Mbaranga Gasarabwe was appointed as UN Deputy Special Representative for MINUSMA in 2015 after having served as the Assistant Secretary-General for Safety and Security at the UN since 2011. Rwanda’s declaration to support conflict prevention, peace, and stabilization effort within Africa led the state to commit Rwandan troops within Mali.