UN MONUSCO

Zachary Hadley, PhD Candidate

AGS Paris

On July 1st, 2010, MONUC was superseded by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). The mission reflected a broad mandate to support the elected government in the completion of operations against armed rebel groups, improve the protection of civilians, and consolidate state authority over its territory¹. The mandate represented a strategic shift from previous efforts to merely separate belligerents and ensure adherence to conditions of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. Future efforts would support institution-building and peace enforcement. At the time, MONUSCO was the largest and most costly UN peacekeeping mission force with nearly 19,000 peacekeepers in the field².

In 2012, former members of the CNDP rebel group defected to form a new militant group, the March 23 Movement (M23), taking refuge in the country side around Goma. Within months, M23 rebels began conducting attacks on FARDC and UN peacekeepers with surprising success. The failure of FARDC forces to contain the rebels in a MONUSCO-supported offensive led to accusations that Rwanda was providing support to the Tutsi rebels. In November 2012, M23 rebels seized the capital of Goma without encountering major resistance from FARDC or UN peacekeepers. UN officials claimed that their mandate only allowed offensive actions in protection of civilians. Fighting the rebels inside of the city could endanger the lives of 500,000 to one million people living in the city³ (Gettleman and Kron, 2012). In February 2013, the UN-brokered Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region outlined a broader strategy in the DRC. It outlined the deployment of a parallel force intervention brigade (FIB) predicated on passage of the agreement among eleven African member states. The force was first proposed by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region with the support of the African Union and SADC. It would be composed of South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops. Ultimately, the FIB would serve as a deterrent and not a replacement for a political solution.

In March 2013, the UN authorized the stand up the FIB to take limited offensive actions against M23 rebels operating within Kivu provinces for one year (S/RES/2098, 2013). Although the FIB was a regional initiative, its authorization by the UN blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement⁴. However, support for the parallel force was not unanimous as some states voiced concerns over the appearance of a shifting MONUSCO mission, a vague employment strategy, and rules of engagement. Citing Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council argued that it had the justification to authorize the force.

In August 2013, coordinated actions between FARDC and the FIB dislodged M23 rebels from areas surrounding Goma. It was the first major test for the new unit⁵ (Katombe, 2013). In November, the M23 group stated that it would “end its rebellion’’ in eastern DRC after a prolonged joint FARDC-UN operation was close to overrunning their last remaining stronghold in eastern DRC. In a statement, the M23 leadership stated that they would choose to pursue their goals “through purely political means.’’ Earlier that year, a UN report made the case that the M23 group was created and supported by Rwanda. International pressure following the report pressured Uganda and Rwanda to suspend support to the group or risk suspension of aid (French, 2013). With the end of the M23 insurgency, MONUSCO focused on the remaining armed rebel groups⁶.

Between 2014 and 2017, the UN Security Council passed seven additional resolutions focused on multidimensional stabilization tasks. In December 2014, MONUSCO and the UN country team conducted a strategic review focused on the implementation of the mission’s mandate and conditions for a future drawdown. The report found that although the political situation in Kinshasa had improved, further progress was needed for upcoming 2016 national elections, which were viewed as “essential for the country’s future peace and stability.’’ Opposition groups called for MONUSCO to play a similar role as MONUC had during the 2006 elections. The implementation of the security sector reform hinged on the ability of MONUSCO and bilateral partners to train, equip, and assist FARDC forces. Similar institution-building efforts focused on the national police required funding and resources to meet the framework’s five-year timeline.

The success of the FIB led to the renewal of its authorities through March 2018⁷. However, joint operations between MONUSCO and FARDC were challenged by disparate levels of unit readiness. The reliance on the FIB to conduct offensive actions against armed groups led the MONUSCO headquarters to rely on this capability at the neglect of framework brigades, which declined in readiness, discipline, and morale. Despite military successes against rebel groups, anti-MONUSCO sentiments among the population increased as poverty, political corruption, and criminal activity continued largely unabated. Furthermore, allegations of rape, human rights violations, and corruption implicated some peacekeeping contingents.

“Efforts to address the conflict’s political dimension in eastern DRC remains key to the success of MONUSCO.”

The implementation of the Nairobi Declaration works towards that objective. Without a clear exit strategy, moribund international support risks reversing the difficult gains achieved over the past twenty years. The lack of regional commitments to supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework continues to impede the mission. Deeping economic integration and cooperation within the Great Lakes region necessitates the need for greater security cooperation. Economic, security, and political reforms focused on developing credible domestic institutions is essential. However, concerns of a peaceful transition of power following December 2018 presidential elections remain. Ongoing political violence continues to foster tensions within Kinshasa. The myriad challenges facing the DRC provide a significant roadblock to a responsible MONUSCO drawdown. Despite evidence of increased economic cooperation within the region, the ambiguous UN strategy has allowed for diverging objectives among peacekeeping contributors. Furthermore, competing UN missions in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mali have fueled increased competition for limited UN resources and funding. The lack of progress in DRC has fostered a growing apathy towards the mission and as a result, resources and funding have plateaued. Fears of conflict in the eastern Kivu provinces have returned.

UN-MONUSCO Model Assessment

Rank	TCC/PCC	REC - SADC	Governance	Political Accountability	Regional Leadership	Trade Across Borders	Model Support?
1	South Africa	YES	69.87	1.21	13.00	65.57	FULL
2	Egypt	NO	47.26	0.16	4.00	70.04	PARTIAL
3	Morocco	NO	56.27	0.75	2.00	82.55	FULL
4	Tanzania	YES	56.24	0.79	5.00	59.15	PARTIAL
5	Malawi	YES	57.46	0.77	2.00	31.18	PARTIAL
6	Benin	NO	58.91	0.94	5.00	60.36	FULL
7	Ghana	NO	66.44	1.09	0.00	64.56	FULL
8	Senegal	NO	59.43	1.11	1.00	74.36	FULL
9	Niger	NO	49.44	0.63	3.00	22.03	PARTIAL
10	Tunisia	NO	62.87	0.90	1.00	81.33	FULL
	Pop. Mean		50.59	0.49	0.49	50.76
	Pop. Median		50.15	0.55	0.00	54.98
Note: Individual state scores are averaged across the time period from 2010-2016.

South Africa as the top contributor achieves upper quartiles scores across each of the explanatory variables. As a regional power and founding SADC member, South Africa took a lead role in early mediation efforts by engaging in high-level dialogue, facilitating the inter-Congolese dialogue, and supporting diplomatic negotiations during the Congo Wars. Despite recent corruption scandals, South Africa’s political institutions are largely pluralistic and credible. Its dominant presence within regional institutions is reflected by its large score on the regional leadership measure. As a member of the BRICS economic organization, South Africa has also increased its market openness and maintains robust trade linkages with its regional economic partners. South Africa views its regional integration as consistent with AU objectives and essential for its sustainable economic growth⁸.

South Africa maintains a modern and effective military force, the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF), which has deployed across sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, it maintains a median score on militarization relative to other African states. Post-apartheid, political reforms led to increased civilian oversight of South Africa’s military institutions⁹. As a result, SANDF influence over foreign policy has waned since the early 1990s. This lends support to the argument that

“Ceteris parabus, political, economic and institutional factors are more reliable predictors for contributions than military capacity alone.”

Egyptian involvement provides partial model with upper quartile scores on trade integration and regional leadership. However, its bottom quartile score on political accountability is emblematic of its history of oppression both under the former Mubarak regime and more recently with the election of President Adbel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014. Despite its domestic political challenges, Egypt has remained a consistent contributor since the 1960s and is currently the seventh largest contributor to UN peacekeeping worldwide. In 2013, the AU suspended Egyptian membership in the regional body in response to the ousting of former President Mohamed Morsi by military coup. Upon re-admittance in 2014, President al-Sisi led efforts to promote regional cooperation with the creation of an Egyptian partnership agency for African development. Egypt was among the earliest contributors to MONUSCO and has maintained a significant role in the execution of the mission. In 2017, attempts by some members of the UN Security Council to single out underperforming contingents led Egypt to directly incorporate a paragraph in the renewed MONUSCO mandate that stated that the failure to fully implement its mandate was the result of “a myriad of issues, some of which were not related to contingent performance’’¹⁰. Egypt maintains a large standing military and is a major recipients of U.S. military aid. As a potential outlier, Egypt consistently ranks among the top militarized states within North Africa and the Middle East and achieves upper quartiles scores on militarization and national capability.

Morocco and Tunisia fully compliment the model’s results with upper quartile scores on governance, political accountability, regional leadership, and trade. Morocco is considered an “essential’’ partner to UN peacekeeping efforts and is a top contributor to both MONUSCO and MINUSCA. Morocco has been an active contributor to peace and stability efforts on the continent since the 1960s. Tunisian support in DRC began in 2001 under UN-MONUC authorities through the transition to MONUSCO in 2010. Within UN Security Council deliberations, Tunisia has strongly advocated for the role and relevance of the African Union to lead peacebuilding efforts on the continent – with continued financial support from international donors¹¹. Focused on containing instability due to its shared border with Libya, Tunisia has taken a lead role in promoting regional security cooperation between the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) member states to include Algeria and Morocco. In 2016, Tunisia committed to increasing its military and police contributions to UN peacekeeping missions to support regional stability. Tunisia has sought to increase its access to global markets and considers trade integration with the European Union as key to securing economic future¹². The examples of Morocco and Tunisia provide support for political, economic, and institutional rationales.

Benin, Ghana, and Senegal also fully support the model with upper quartile scores across political, economic, and institutional rationales. Benin’s contributions to DRC began in 2006 under UN-MONUC authorities and have remained consistent under MONUSCO. Benin is an active partner within ECOWAS and maintains strong economic ties to other regional states. On good governance and political accountability measures, Benin was the first African state to fully transition from a military dictatorship to a pluralistic democracy in 1991. Ghana support for MONUSCO began with the deployment of peacekeepers to DRC in 2001 under MONUC. Ghana is an active contributor to regional security efforts, having supported ECOWAS during the Malian intervention under AU-AFISMA. More recently, Ghana has deployed contingents to support the AU-led AMISOM mission in Somalia. Ghana has also deployed peacekeepers to other regional hotspots including MINUSMA in Mali and UNMISS in South Sudan. Ghana achieves high scores on good governance and political accountability. Despite its security cooperation, trade barriers to intraregional trade impact Ghana’s scores on trade integration. As Ghana and Nigeria combined account for nearly 61 percent of the West African population and 68 percent of gross domestic product for ECOWAS, efforts to remove trade restrictions between Nigeria and Ghana offer an opportunity for diffuse economic and security for the entire community. Senegal is a significant contributor to regional efforts having supported ECOWAS, AU, and UN missions for decades. Peace and security efforts are considered central to Senegal’s foreign policy objectives. With upper quartile score across the explanatory variables, Senegal provides full support for the model.

Of the top ten contributors, Tanzania and Malawi are the only SADC members besides South Africa currently supporting the MONUSCO mission as a parallel force through the Force Intervention Brigade. This leads to suspicion that the regional roots of the Congo wars has limited the support for contributions from other SADC members. Despite efforts by the SADC Force Intervention Brigade to combat armed rebel groups operating in eastern DRC, allegations of outside state support remain¹³. Moreover, the rocky relationship between MONUSCO and the Kabila administration has stymied stabilization efforts as directed by its UNSCR mandate. As President Kabila seeks a third term in December 2018, fears of renewed conflict have placed the MONUSCO mission in a difficult position. That neighboring countries are reluctant to commit forces to MONUSCO is perhaps expected.

The ultimate success of the mission will depend upon the resolve and commitment by regional powers including South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco to commit significant resources to support and train DRC’s security forces while encouraging institutional reforms and power-sharing. The alternative – disengagement from eastern DRC – will likely accelerate a relapse into wider conflict that fuels regional destabilization. The ability of international community to apply pressure on the Kabila administration to ensure free and fair elections in December 2018 will serve a critical test of that resolve. President Joseph Kabila, critical of MONUSCO, has called for the UN to provide Kinshasa a roadmap for withdrawal¹⁴. Free of international oversight, the various belligerents may again vie for control of the country’s vast natural resources fueling ever greater levels of political, ethnic, and civil violence.